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An Analysis of Factors Affecting 
the Royal Air Force Contribution 
to the Raid on Dieppe, 1942 
 
D AV I D  S T U B B S
Abstract : This paper seeks to explain the limited options available to Air 
Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory when planning the Royal Air Force 
(raf) portion of the combined operation raid on Dieppe in 1942. It proposes 
that a number of constraining influences, some self-imposed, reduced the 
air support options, so that only an air umbrella over the attacking forces 
could be provided. It argues that these influences were a consequence 
of the raf’s cultural and conceptual environment, which perpetuated 
Trenchardian notions of offensive spirit in raf doctrine, together with 
the refusal to consider options to extend the range of its fighter aircraft. 
The paper rejects claims that the raf’s effort at Dieppe was the natural 
evolution of combined operations doctrine and demonstrates that pre-
emptive bombing of Dieppe was politically unacceptable. 
The appalling losses suffered during the raid on Dieppe on 19 August 1942 sparked a controversy that induced many historians 
to attempt to untangle the processes that led to its regeneration 
and approval as Operation Jubilee after Operation Rutter, an earlier 
incarnation of the same raid, had been cancelled. The egregious 
political climber Vice-Admiral Louis Mountbatten, second cousin 
once removed to Princess Elizabeth, commanded the raid after the 
British prime minister, Winston Churchill, had elevated him three 
steps in rank in March 1942, against the advice of Admiral of the 
Fleet Sir Dudley Pound.1 Churchill had also supported Mountbatten’s 
1  David Reynolds, In Command of History (New York: Random House, 2005), 341–
343, 347. 
© Canadian Military History, 2016
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appointment to the post of Chief of Combined Operations (cco). 
Robin Neillands showed that Churchill knew about the plans for the 
raid on Dieppe because, on 17 August 1942, when in Cairo he had 
asked for news of Operation Jubilee and was told that it had been 
delayed by weather and would instead take place at first light on 
19 August.2 Mountbatten probably assumed that he had been given 
permission for the raid to go ahead on his own authority, as he had 
for other raids, and that Churchill’s knowledge of the raid and his 
interest in its outcome cemented this belief.3 
In 1989 Brian Loring Villa claimed that Air Chief Marshal 
Sir Charles Portal, the Chief of the Air Staff, thought the raid on 
Dieppe would act as ‘bait’ to provoke the routinely evasive Luftwaffe 
into engaging in a large-scale air battle in the hope that the Royal 
Air Force (raf) might inflict significant damage on the it.4 Villa 
also suggested that Portal had deliberately engineered raf bomber 
availability in order to deny the forces attacking Dieppe bomber 
support, limiting the raf’s air support options to the provision of air 
cover. Villa argued that effectively synchronised bombing, together 
with fighter cover, could have decisively affected the German defenders 
ability to repel the assault. More recently, Timothy Balzer explained 
how that the combined operations headquarters (cohq) deliberately 
concocted the post raid narrative to minimise any negativity about 
the disastrous outcome, manipulating the facts to promote the raid as 
positively as possible.5 In this regard the raf element of the combined 
headquarters produced questionable statistics to support its claims 
that the air battle had been a great success.
Although Norman Franks’s seminal description of the raf’s 
involvement over Dieppe, made reference to available cohq and air 
files it was written in 1979, ten years before Villa’s book was published 
2  Robin Neillands, The Dieppe Raid: The Story of the Disastrous 1942 expedition 
(London: Aurum, 2005), 114.
3  P.J. Henshaw, “The Dieppe Raid: A Product of Misplaced Canadian Nationalism?” 
Canadian Historical Review 77, no. 2 (June 1996), 250–266. T. Balzer, “‘In Case the 
Raid Is Unsuccessful...’: Selling Dieppe to Canadians,” The Canadian Historical 
Review 87, no. 3 (September 2006), 410–411. 
4  Brian Loring Villa, Unauthorised Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid 
(Ontario: Oxford University Press, 1989), 158.
5  Balzer, “‘In Case the Raid Is Unsuccessful,’” 411. CAB/65/31/18, Chief of Combined 
Operations, 20 August 1942, Air Ministry to C-in-C Middle East, Most Secret Cypher 
Telegram, TULIP 222 For Prime Minister from C.C.O, 20 August 1942, The Ministry 
of Information, Combined Operations (London: HMSO, 1943), 135–136.
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and was insufficiently detailed to critically analyse whether raf kill 
claims were deliberately manipulated to project an unduly positive 
picture. By 1985 John Terraine had concluded that the post raid 
declaration “Air Cooperation faultless” really meant little more than 
that the ships and soldiers had not been molested from the air.6 John 
Campbell’s excellent investigation into the documents surrounding the 
Dieppe raid, published in 1993, neither verified nor refuted the validity 
of the charges levelled against Portal by Villa, but noted that the raf’s 
achievement of local air superiority was gained at considerable cost 
because of the tactical advantages enjoyed by the Luftwaffe, which 
had used its knowledge of the short range of raf fighters to devise 
appropriate tactics.7 In 2012 Ross Mahoney countered Villa’s charges 
by claiming that in pursuing its part in the Dieppe combined operation 
the raf had simply endeavoured to achieve the role envisaged for it 
in combined operations doctrine.8 The aim of this paper, therefore, 
is to provide a fuller examination of the rationale for the limitations 
of the raf’s support for Operation Jubilee in order to show that the 
raf’s activities over Dieppe were neither the product of a deliberate 
conspiracy by Portal to deny those attacking Dieppe bomber support, 
nor the natural corollary of combined operations doctrine but, instead, 
the consequence of a number of constraining influences under which 
Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the raf’s Force Commander 
for the Operation, was working and the way these factors, many of 
which were self-imposed, conspired to limit his options for air support.
tenchard’s doctrine of air superiority: willpower 
preeminent 
In 1942 most of the raf’s senior leaders had been conditioned to 
think of the effectiveness of air power through subjective assessments 
of its effect on enemy morale and to prefer offensive over defensive 
activities in the belief that heavy losses were a constituent part of 
modern air warfare. The raf taught its senior officers to believe 
6  J. Terraine, The Right of the Line (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), 561.
7  J.P. Campbell, Dieppe Revisited: A Documentary Investigation (London: Frank 
Cass, 1993), 189.
8  R. Mahoney, ““The support afforded by the air force was faultless” The Royal Air 
Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942,” Canadian Military History 21, no. 
4 (Autumn 2012).
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that in a battle of willpower between air forces any unwillingness 
to accept high losses might precipitate a morale collapse that would 
percolate through its population and, eventually, to the government. 
The lineage of raf doctrine to get to this point, as Neville Parton 
has pointed out, began after 1923, five years after the raf became an 
independent service because, until then, it had not committed itself 
to a doctrine of war-winning independent action. Indeed, the raf’s 
first two major doctrinal publications, Confidential Document 22 and 
its War Manual, Air Publication 1300, leaned heavily on Army and 
Royal Navy doctrine for their content. These documents accepted 
the Royal Navy’s interpretation of the term ‘aerial supremacy’ and 
agreed on the importance of winning it over friendly forces while 
denying it to the enemy.9 raf doctrine after 1923, however, contrived 
a quite different meaning of air superiority that combined the raf’s 
newfound offensive doctrinal mantra with a belief that enemy morale 
would be affected if its air forces suffered high loss rates and the 
vulnerability of its population became abundantly apparent. 
Air Chief-Marshal Hugh Trenchard, who began his second spell 
as Chief of the Air Staff in 1919 and stayed in post until 1930, 
believed ‘moral tenacity’ to be more valuable than ‘conceptual 
dynamism.’10 Understandably, most senior raf officers who attended 
staff college became aware of Trenchard’s predilection for the moral 
over the conceptual and in a similar vein and tended to avoid objective 
examination of the facts. Instead, they were encouraged to make 
subjective assessments based on their own combat experience, which 
was easy to do since their thinking was never seriously challenged. 
For example, many First World War raf pilots disliked flying close 
air support missions and believed that they resulted in excessively 
disproportionate losses.11 It appears that no comparative analysis of 
9  Neville Parton, “The Development of Early RAF Doctrine,” Journal of Military 
History 72, no. 4 (October 2008), 1155–1169.
10  P.S. Meilinger, “Trenchard, Slessor and Royal Air Force Doctrine before World 
War II” in P.S. Meilinger, ed., The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower 
Theory (Air University Press, 2004), 47, 51.
11  Alistair McCluskey, “The Battle of Amiens and the Development of British Air-
Land Battle, 1918–1945,” in Gary Sheffield and Peter Gray, eds., Changing War: The 
British Army, The Hundred Days Campaign and the Birth of the Royal Air Force, 
1918 (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 238, 240, 244. See also B. E. Smythies, 
D.F.C. AP965: A selection of lectures and essays from the work of officers attending 
the first course at the RAF Staff College 1922–1923 (London: Air Ministry, 1923), 
80, 86. Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, Years of Combat (London: Collins, 1963), 240.
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the relative utility of such missions, based on the evidence, was ever 
undertaken by those who attended raf staff college. Instead, students 
were, it appears, minded to agree with Trenchard’s view that the 
achievement of air superiority was a morale equation, influenced by 
a willingness to maintain the offensive and accept the losses incurred 
in the air-to-air variant of air combat. 
Trenchard saw air warfare as a battle of willpower between 
different teams, with each side trying to weaken the morale of the 
other to a point where one side would be forced to cease offensive 
action and concentrate instead on defence. This, in part, explains 
his unremitting policy of offence during the First World War and his 
willingness to accept the loss of large numbers of aircraft, pilots, and 
observers as a regrettable necessity. In suggesting a way to mitigate 
the horrendous losses, the more conceptually inclined Lieutenant 
Colonel Hugh Dowding asked Trenchard to periodically consider 
relieving squadrons from the front line. While Trenchard reluctantly 
agreed he sensed in Dowding a lack of the necessary resolve to win 
the battle of wills and thought him so “obsessed by the fear of further 
casualties” that, shortly afterwards, he dispatched him back to 
England.12 Thereafter, it appears that Trenchard harboured nagging 
doubts about Dowding’s willingness to focus on offensive activities 
and accept high losses as a matter of necessity. 
“The French,” Trenchard claimed in 1923, “in a bombing duel 
would probably squeal before we did … The nation that would stand 
being bombed longest would win in the end.”13 Essentially, Trenchard 
believed willpower, morale and air superiority were inextricably 
linked and although he was notoriously inarticulate he managed to 
explain his atypical definition of air superiority in these terms with 
some clarity when addressing the Imperial Defence College in 1928: 
 
Air superiority is gained in the course of the air attacks which are 
delivered against the enemy’s vital centres [so that] the enemy’s 
population and even their high command ... feel that they must defend 
themselves against air attacks instead of counter attacking, then there 
12  J. Ray, The Battle of Britain New Perspectives: Behind the scenes of the Great Air 
War (London: Brockhampton Press, 1999), 19. Also in Vincent Orange, Dowding of 
Fighter Command: Victor of the Battle of Britain (London: Grub Street, 2008) 35–36.
13  The National Archives (TNA), Minutes of a Conference held in C.A.S.’s Room, 
Air Ministry, on 19th July, 1923, at 11 a.m., 19 July 1923, AIR 5/416, 5.
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will begin demands for air protection and aircraft will be detached from 
the offensive to the defensive. … When one air force has in this way 
thrown the other on to the defensive, it has gained air superiority.14
However, the same year the raf’s War Manual, when defining 
air superiority, appeared to place more emphasis on the physical 
activities necessary to deny the enemy air force the opportunity to 
interfere with offensive attacks. It described air superiority as:
 
A state of moral, physical and material superiority which enables its 
possessor to conduct operations against an enemy, and at the same time 
deprive the enemy of the ability to interfere effectively by the use of his 
own air forces.15
Trenchard, however, was not convinced that offensive counter air 
operations to target the enemy’s air force would be worthwhile:
 
It is not the Air Staff policy in a major war to concentrate and confine 
the air offensive against the enemy air forces. The reason for this is 
that that is an unprofitable way of using aircraft. It is exceedingly 
difficult, if not impossible in a war against an air power to destroy the 
air organisation of the enemy by air attacks upon his aerodromes.16
Only when Trenchard retired did his influence on raf doctrine 
began to wane.17 In 1931 Wing Commander Trafford Leigh-Mallory 
suggested two scenarios when attacks on enemy aerodromes might 
be worthwhile. One of these was for a surprise attack to be carried 
out to disorganise the enemy air force on the eve of some important 
military operation.18 By 1940 the raf War Manual had matured 
sufficiently to acknowledge the potential benefits of ‘destroying 
aircraft and material on the ground and dislocating ground services’ 
14  TNA, Lord Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff, Air Staff Memorandum, No. 43 
S.28279: The War Aim of the Royal Air Force, in an address to the Imperial Defence 
College, 1928, AIR 5/169, 5–6.
15  Air Ministry, AP1300, Part I (1928), Chapter VII, 10.
16  TNA, Lord Trenchard, Air Staff Memorandum, No. 43, AIR 5/169, 4.
17  Group Captain Neville Parton, “Historic Book Review, Basic Principles of Air 
Warfare, by ‘Squadron Leader,’” Air Power Review 10, no. 2, (2007), 94–98. 
18  Wing Commander T. Leigh-Mallory, “The Maintenance of Air Superiority in a 
Land Campaign,” Royal Air Force Quarterly II, no. 2, (April 1931).
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though the manual suggested that any advantage gained would likely 
be short-lived.19 Unfortunately, the reality of the disasters suffered by 
the raf after the Luftwaffe’s offensive counter air campaigns against 
it in Flanders and Norway in 1940, and in Greece in 1941 failed to 
percolate, as a lesson learned, into the collective consciousness of 
fighter command’s commander-in-chief, Sir William Sholto Douglas 
or his group commanders. Instead, of recognising the benefits of 
supplementing any air-to-air fighting by disrupting, bombing, and 
strafing enemy aircraft on the ground, Sholto Douglas persevered 
with the notion that the best way to destroy the maximum number 
of enemy aircraft was to induce the opposing air force into a large 
attritional air battle.20
royal navy demands for air cover
When trying to understand the emphasis placed on protecting the 
assaulting forces at Dieppe it is necessary to explain Royal Navy’s 
volte-face with regard to the need for air support. Before the Second 
World War the Royal Navy (rn), the British army, and the raf 
had interpreted the lessons of the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War 
along single service lines, to support their preconceived doctrinal 
views and procurement priorities. The rn had long held the view 
that aircraft would continue to be unable to sink capital ships and 
in reviewing the evidence from Spain the deputy director of naval 
intelligence opined that air attack against ships did not threaten 
to sweep the rn from the seas and that ships manoeuvring at high 
speed, concentrating their combined anti-aircraft (aa) fire, would 
fare well against low-level attack.21
However, the Norwegian campaign, in April and May 1940, 
showed beyond any doubt the vulnerability of capital ships to air 
attack when, ironically given the rn’s perspective on the vulnerability 
of capital ships, the German navy’s light cruiser Konigsberg became 
the first major warship to be sunk by rn dive bombers. Soon after 
the anti-aircraft cruiser hms Curlew was bombed and sunk by the 
19  AP1300, RAF War Manual, April 1940, Chapter VIII, paras. 23–24. 
20  Sholto Douglas, Years of Command (London: Collins, 1966), 85-86
21  Greg Kennedy, “The Royal Navy, Intelligence and the Spanish Civil War: Lessons in 
Air Power, 1936–39,” Intelligence and National Security 20, no 2, (2005), 253, 255, 259.
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Luftwaffe near Narvik. In less than thirty days the reality of the air 
threat to warships became clear to everyone, after the Royal Navy 
lost six destroyers in the evacuation of the British Expeditionary 
Forces from Dunkirk. Thereafter, Royal Navy sailors feared the sight 
of aircraft to such an extent that they often ignored the requirement 
to identify friend from foe before firing.22
Yet, instead of acknowledging its conceptual failure in ignoring the 
threat from the air the rn turned the tables by blaming the raf for 
not providing the protection it now acknowledged it needed. During 
the Dunkirk evacuation Vice-Admiral Dover Bertram Ramsay, the 
sailor responsible for the evacuation from Dunkirk, had signalled the 
raf’s fighter, bomber, and coastal commands to say “Your assistance 
has been invaluable. It alone has given us a chance of success and I 
trust you will be able to keep it up.”23 However, less than three weeks 
later, on 18 June, when reporting to his superiors he expressed his 
“disappointment and surprise at the seemingly puny efforts made to 
provide air protection during the height of the operation,” and that 
“rightly or wrongly full air protection was expected.”24 In a similar 
vein Mountbatten’s experience as the Captain of hms Kelly influenced 
his views of the use of air power when planning the Dieppe raid. On 
23 May 1941 a Luftwaffe Ju87 ‘Stuka’ dive-bomber sank his ship 
near Crete. Mountbatten, like Ramsay now believed that full air 
support was necessary to enable successful maritime operations.25
the impact of the obsession with the big wing concept
Another constraint in deciding the type and level of air support 
the raf would provide at Dieppe was can be traced to the legacy 
of the ‘Big Wing’ dispute during the Battle of Britain in 1940. The 
differences between Trenchard’s subjective, offense-focused doctrinal 
22  Vincent Orange, Park: The Biography of Air Chief Marshall Sir Keith Park, 
GCB, KBE, MC, DFC, DCL (London: Grub Street, 2010), 85, 88. H.R ‘Dizzy’ 
Allen, DFC,Battle for Britain (London: Arthur Baker, 1973), 61-63,71. Denis John 
Vellacot Oral History IWM interview of Vellacott, a wireless operator/air gunner 
with 30 Sqn, RAF in Middle East, Greece, Crete, 1940-1941. http://www.iwm.org.
uk/collections/item/object/80023018
23  TNA, AIR 16/1170-3
24  Ibid. 
25  Air Historical Branch (AHB), RAF Narrative, The Campaign in Crete, May 1941, 
First Draft, 72.
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view of air superiority, and an alternative objective definition which 
reflected the suggestion made by Leigh-Mallory in his 1931 article: 
“the attainment of operational freedom by our own aircraft, and 
denying it to the enemy,” underpinned the arguments over the tactics 
used by the commander-in-chief fighter command, Air Chief Marshal 
Sir Hugh Dowding, and his Air Officer Commanding hq 11 Group 
Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park in the Battle of Britain. Dowding’s 
strategy was to deny the Germans the air superiority necessary for 
them to conduct Operation Sealion, the invasion of England, whereas 
his detractors in the Air Ministry, many of whom remained close to 
Trenchard, thought he should be more offensively focused, and try 
to inflict the maximum possible attrition on the Luftwaffe.26 This, 
they believed, could be achieved by pitting as many raf fighters as 
possible against the enemy in a large air-to-air battle. 
The idea of committing wing-sized formations into an air battle 
had been considered but rejected in August 1939, after the Air Ministry 
had asked Dowding to investigate whether fighter formations larger 
than squadron strength could be mustered to operate effectively as 
a single formation. His response, drafted after Wing Commander G. 
Lawson conducted air trials, concluded that large formations would 
be cumbersome to keep together in formation and would break up 
when attacked, and were therefore of little tactical value.27 Park 
verified this assessment when he flew his Hurricane over Dunkirk 
during the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force.28 Park 
knew that the practical difficulties in getting disparate Spitfire and 
Hurricane squadrons to work together would be exacerbated by their 
incompatible high-frequency (hf) and very high frequency (vhf) radio 
sets which hindered the ability of large formations to communicate 
effectively. Moreover, to Park’s great irritation, upgrading radio sets 
in raf fighters to a single standard proved to be an extraordinarily 
slow process.
The main proponent of the ‘Big Wing’ concept at the tactical 
level was Squadron Leader Douglas Bader who had rejoined the 
raf in the winter of 1939 after being invalided out of the service in 
26  H.C.T. Dowding, Twelve Legions of Angels (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 
1941), 37.
27  Orange, Park, 72.
28  TNA, 15 August 1939, AIR 16/131. David Isby, Decisive Duel (London: Little 
Brown, 2012), 112. 
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1933. Bader’s personality and self-belief was reinforced by the two 
years he spent as a cadet at Royal Air Force college at Cranwell, 
an institution that embodied Trenchard’s offensive thinking and 
provided the main route to the higher appointments by means of the 
permanent commissions granted after the completion of the course.29 
Bader thrived at Cranwell, as it provided an ideal outlet for his 
natural aggression and sporting talent. 
Laddie Lucas, who later became his brother-in-law, believed 
that Bader’s “indoctrination (at Cranwell) was complete, blind and 
lasting.”30 Yet, in his first period of service, from 1928 to 1933, Bader 
did not fly in an operational environment and on his return to the 
raf in 1939 he knew next to nothing about the development of radar 
detection or the workings of the air defence system created in his 
absence. He was also unaware of the lessons learned during the Home 
Defence Exercises, which sought to integrate the information derived 
from radar and the observer corps in order to position modern fighter 
aircraft to meet the threat. Moreover, instead of embracing the 
opportunities enabled by the new technology, Bader disliked working 
with the fighter controllers and preferred to ignore them or belittle 
29  Chief of the Air Staff, An Outline Scheme for the Permanent Organization of the 
Royal Air Force (London: HMSO, 1919), 5.
30  Laddie Lucas, Flying Colours: The Epic Story of Douglas Bader (London: 
Hutchinson, 1981), 27.
Bader in his Senior Term, 1930. Seated centre left, bottom row. [RAF Museum]
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their input as interference.31 It is a conundrum, therefore, why after 
Dunkirk Leigh-Mallory chose to believe Bader over Park in arguments 
about the value of using fighters in larger formations.32 The seeds of 
this volte-face were probably sown in October 1938 when Dowding 
refused an idea by Leigh-Mallory to move the majority of fighter 
squadrons to 12 Group’s area. Dowding thought that in proposing 
the idea Leigh-Mallory had shown his “misconception of the basic 
ideas of fighter defence.”33 The break in trust between the two men 
may have been cemented in the debrief following a 1939 Air Defence 
exercise when, in front of an assembled audience of officers, Dowding 
told Leigh-Mallory “The trouble with you, Leigh-Mallory, is that you 
sometimes cannot see further than the end of your little nose.”34
In 1940 Leigh-Mallory’s antipathy towards Dowding and his 
exposure to the opinions of Douglas Bader appear to have led him to 
revise his 1931 opinion on the methodology to achieve air superiority 
or deny it to an opponent. He became the vociferous advocate of 
the Big Wing idea, which neatly tallied with Trenchard’s offensive 
thinking and the aspirations of the Air Ministry. Essentially, Leigh-
Mallory now agreed with those who believed that the raf could deny 
the Luftwaffe air superiority and simultaneously inflict significant 
losses on it. raf doctrine, as we have seen, maintained that such 
losses would prove decisive in affecting the morale of the Luftwaffe 
pilots and, ultimately, their commanders. So, while Park’s defensive 
tactics were effective in frustrating the Luftwaffe fighter pilots who 
bemoaned the raf’s elusiveness35 many of the raf’s senior leaders 
believed they were little short of a reflection of Dowding’s preference 
for the defensive over the offensive.36 Fighter pilots stationed with 
Bader at raf Duxford in 12 Group’s area became mesmerised by 
his ideas and were happy to ignore the orders given by the fighter 
controllers when following him into 11 Group’s area looking for a 
31  Michael. G. Burns, Bader: The Man and his Men (London: Arms and Armour, 
1994), 85.
32  Bill Newton Dunn, Big Wing (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1992), 67.
33  Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy (London: Aurum Press, 2009), 
132–133.
34  John Ray, The Battle of Britain: New Perspectives (Leicester: Brockhampton 
Press, 2000), 18.
35  John Frayn Turner, The Bader Tapes (Bourne End: Kensal Press, 1986), 93 
36  Ibid.
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fight.37 The problem with this bravado was that the Home Chain radar 
system only looked outwards and Bader’s decision to go where he 
wished confused the observer corps into thinking his wing an enemy 
formation, creating a potential “blue-on-blue” situation in today’s 
language that greatly interfered with Park’s management of the air 
battle. Incredibly, despite his years of experience at 12 Group, Leigh-
Mallory could not understand how Bader’s unauthorised incursions 
caused identification problems and responded to Park’s complaints by 
declaring they were “merely trying to get a bag.”38
Only much later, in their memoirs, did Bader’s previously 
bewitched subordinates reveal their embarrassment at being so 
naïve.39 Some, such as Flying Officer F.N. Brindsen, who like Bader 
was stationed at raf Duxford, albeit on 19 Squadron, had harboured 
doubts about Bader’s tactical ideas at the time. He would not have 
seen Lawson’s trial report but he came to the same conclusion:
 
I was never a fan of Bader ‘Balbos’ considering them time wasting in 
assembly and cumbersome in operation. In any case the formations 
fragmented when battle was joined, so why waste precious time 
assembling them?40
It was 1956 before Johnnie Johnson, the raf’s top scoring fighter 
pilot in the Second World War, another who flew with Bader from 
raf Tangmere, described how Big Wings were unwieldy, difficult 
to control and caused aircraft to get in each other’s way in a fight 
so that only the leaders could bring their guns to bear. Johnson 
also thought the very size of wing formations reduced the element 
of surprise, as they could be seen so much earlier.41 At the time, 
however, the narrative suggested by Leigh-Mallory incorporated 12 
Group’s extraordinarily high kill claims and appeared to prove the 
37  Ray, The Battle of Britain, 111–112. Sebastian Cox, Sholto Douglas and Leigh 
Mallory, John Jupp, eds., Air Force Leadership: Changing Culture (Sleaford, Royal 
Air Force Leadership Centre, 2007), 47–48.
38  Sholto Douglas, Years of Command, 90. John Ray, The Battle of Britain, 161.
39  Hugh Dundas, Flying Start (London: Penguin, 1990), 61–62.
40  Derek Palmer, Fighter Squadron (Torquay: Devonshire Press, 1991), 189.
41  Johnnie Johnson, Big Wing, 60–61.
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tactics were more effective than those being used in 11 Group.42 
Although Park suspected that the figures were based on suspiciously 
gross false accounting, the ‘evidence’ correlated with the perception 
by many in the Air Ministry, that the strategy defined by Dowding 
and employed by Park was overly defensive. In contrast Leigh-
Mallory’s claims had a magnetic effect on those who wished to 
remove Dowding and Park and accorded with Trenchard’s opinion 
that it was essential to have resolve and spirit necessary to accept a 
high number of casualties in order to destroy enough enemy aircraft 
to achieve air superiority. 
Around this time Sholto Douglas began a daily telephone 
dialogue with Leigh-Mallory to discuss Park’s tactical conduct of 
the battle.43 In the minds of many senior raf officers at the Air 
Ministry, including Air Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferté, Air 
Commodore John Slessor, Air Commodore Donald Stevenson and 
Group Captain Henry Crowe the Big Wing narrative had won the 
argument: for them Dowding and Park had been mismanaging the 
battle. In fact, Dowding and Park became so frustrated with the 
inability of other senior raf officers to appreciate the validity of their 
tactics, or to understand the importance of denying the Luftwaffe air 
superiority, that on 7 September 1940 they decided to lecture Sholto 
Douglas about the realities of air defence as though he was a rather 
naïve fool.44
Although he had retired ten years earlier Trenchard chose to 
become involved with those supporting Sholto Douglas and he used 
his influence over his numerous protégés in the military and political 
spheres to help relieve Dowding and Park of their jobs.45 Sholto 
Douglas’s revenge for being patronised was achieved when he was 
42  Alfred Price, Battle of Britain Day (Journal 29, RAF Historical Society, 2003) 
14–15. James Holland, The Battle of Britain: Five months that changed history May–
October 1940 (London: Bantam Press, 2010), 592–593. M.G.Burns, Bader: The man 
and his men (London: Arms and Armour, 1944), 90, 94. Terraine, Right of the Line, 
200–203. Orange, Dowding, 200–201.
43  Kenneth Cross, Straight and Level (London: Grub Street, 1993), 123.
44  John Ray, The Battle of Britain, 90–92. Bungay, Most Dangerous Enemy, 299–
300. Jack Dixon, Dowding and Churchill: The dark side of the Battle of Britain 
(Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2008), 155.
45  John Ray, The Battle of Britain, 136–139, 142, 169. Group Captain Peter Gray, 
“The Battle of Britain—so we already know the story, RAF,” Air Power Review 
3, no. 3, (2000), 26–27. Cox, Sholto Douglas, Leigh Mallory, Jupp, eds., Air Force 
Leadership, 45–50. Terraine, Right of the Line, 202, 216–217.
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given Dowding’s job. The longer term consequence of these changes 
was the conceptual commitment, by Sholto Douglas and Leigh-Mallory, 
to the idea of using Big Wings of fighters in offensive fighter sweeps of 
northern France, known as ‘Rhubarbs’, and in similar ‘Circus’ missions 
which combined a mixture of bombers and fighters in an attempt to 
lure the Luftwaffe fighters into a battle of attrition. The main reason 
for persevering with these tactics can be explained by the mistaken 
belief in the raf’s pilots kill claims, which although less impressive 
in ratio terms than those claimed during Big Wing operations in the 
Battle of Britain, continued to suggest a good return.
the emphasis on kill claims 
One of the main difficulties in accurately determining how well the 
raf performed at Dieppe is that before the raid the primary aim had 
been to focus on the relative number of aircraft shot down by either 
side. Only after the raid did the narrative alter to claim that main 
focus of the raf support had been to keep the Luftwaffe away from 
the battle area so that the troops on the ground were not harassed or 
molested by enemy air attacks; that the relative number of aircraft 
lost was not really that important.46 The change in this narrative, it 
should be noted, began the day after the raid when the horrendously 
high Canadian casualties became apparent. Air Chief Marshal Sir 
Charles Portal, the Chief of the Air Staff, sought to distance himself 
from the idea that the raf had used the Dieppe raid to induce a 
large air-to-air battle with the Luftwaffe.47 But in 1941 and 1942, the 
relative number of Luftwaffe aircraft reported destroyed or damaged 
by the raf was a fundamental constituent of assessments made 
about the effectiveness of the air campaign because the responsible 
raf senior officers had become conditioned to believe they were 
important, as had their political masters. Certainly, that is where 
their attention was focused in the planning for the raid.
Sholto Douglas had a conceptual aversion to the idea that long-
range fighters should escort bombers, and had vehemently argued 
46  Sholto Douglas, Years of Command, 175.
47  CAB/65/31/18, W.M. (42) 115TH Conclusions, Minute 1, Confidential Annex, 
20th August, 1942 6.0 pm, 20 August 1942. 
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against them since 1937.48 So, in November 1940 when the Air Ministry 
directed fighter command to conduct offensive missions over France 
his short-range Spitfire’s were unable to penetrate very far into France. 
An attempt was made to provide fifty Spitfire Mk iia squadrons 
with forty gallons of additional fuel in a single fixed-wing tank but 
although the flight trials assessed the Mk IIa model “satisfactory as 
a fighter” the aircraft proved unpopular with pilots who considered 
it cumbersome and vulnerable because of its reduced maximum 
speed and climbing performance, which together with worries about 
belly landings led the pilots to believe that they were at a significant 
disadvantage to the Luftwaffe fighters.49 Portal, no doubt heavily 
influenced by Sholto Douglas’s views on long-range fighters, advised 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill that it was unfair to expect raf 
pilots to fight at a disadvantage, that long-range fighters could never 
hold their own against short-range fighters and were only suitable for 
employment where short-range fighters would not oppose them. So, 
until late 1943, Spitfire fighters were constrained to the narrow part 
48  TNA, Air Fighting Committee Minutes, 9 June 1937, AIR 20/3605.
49  Hubert Raymond Allen, Fighter Squadron (London: Granada, 1979), 139–140. 
Alfred Price, The Spitfire Story (London: Arms and Armour, 1999), 109, 114.
A Spitfire MkIIa with a 40 gallon single port wing fixed fuel tank. [http://s412.photobucket.com/
user/ruspren/media/ruspren001/IMG_0703_zpsa8b0b786.jpg.html]
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of the French coast that they could reach and patrol for relatively 
short periods of time.50
When fighter sweeps over France began in late 1940 the 
prime minister, Winston Churchill, was keenly interested in the 
effectiveness of these operations, particularly if anything went wrong. 
On 9 February 1941, Churchill asked Portal to explain why eight 
raf fighters had been lost for claims of only two enemy destroyed 
and one probably lost on a ‘sweep’ over France four days earlier. 
Portal explained that “a serious breakdown between the Fighter and 
Bomber Commands had occurred and that the bombers had arrived 
at the rendezvous point late causing the various waves of fighters to 
be thrown out of gear.”51 Squadron Leader Kenneth Cross noted how 
the Germans exploited the Spitfire’s lack of range by sequencing their 
attacks to coincide with the Spitfire’s most vulnerable period of the 
sortie: at the end of the time provisioned over France when the pilot’s 
ability to offer air combat was compromised by the limited amount 
of fuel at his disposal.52 The apparent futility of these operations was 
not lost on many of the pilots taking part. Nevertheless, some of the 
wing leaders, including Wing Commander Douglas Bader, saw these 
operations as an opportunity to increase their personal ‘score’ of 
50  David Stubbs, “A Blind Spot? The Royal Air Force (RAF) and Long-Range 
Fighters, 1936–1944,” The Journal of Military History 78, no. 2 (April 2014), 673–678.
51  Bill Newton Dunn, Big Wing (Shrewsbury, U.K: Airlife, 1992), 82–83.
52  Kenneth Cross, Straight and Level, 123.
Source: UK Crown Copyright. Courtesy of AHB(RAF)
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enemy aircraft and any questioning as to the military value of Circus 
operations by rank and file pilots was quickly quelled; a response 
that typified the perception of Bader as an insensitive bully with a 
fondness for self-promotion by many of those who worked with him.53
At fighter command the utility of continuing fighter sweeps or 
Circus operations was rarely questioned, but the exceptions to this 
norm were prescient. On 7 March 1941 none other than Sir Douglas 
Evill, Sholto Douglas’s senior air staff officer, articulated his doubts 
about their effectiveness.54 Shortly afterwards, in one of Leigh-
Mallory’s regular conferences at raf Northolt through which he gained 
a more detailed tactical understanding of what was happening, Wing 
Commander John Kent, rcaf, vociferously explained the impact of 
the Spitfire’s short flying radius had on his pilots’ morale and fighting 
spirit.55 In June 1941 Kent’s interjection may have influenced Leigh-
Mallory to tell Sholto Douglas about his high fighter casualty rates 
and question whether the wing sweep operations were paying off.56 
The problem he had was that in accepting the kill claims made during 
these operations wa‘that the corollary of believing and promoting 
the kill claims made during these operations was that it persuaded 
senior RAF officers that wing tactics were working and the RAF 
was extracting at least an equal toll on Luftwaffe fighters. Gradually, 
however, even amongst the most blinkered optimists, there was a 
dawning realisation that something was amiss.57 Squadron Leader 
Billy Burton, the officer commanding 616 Squadron, in Bader’s wing 
at Tangmere, sensed this anxiety and claimed that when Bader 
was shot down in August 1941 the wing was in a state of mutiny 
brought on by his reckless leading in an effort to increase his own 
score.58Bader, of course, was so admired by Leigh-Mallory and Sholto 
Douglas that arrangements to send him another prosthetic leg were 
coordinated with the Germans when reports that one of his prosthetic 
legs had been lost when he was shot down were received. An angry 
53  Martin Francis, The Flyer: British Culture and the Royal Air Force 1939–1945 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 133–134. Cross, Straight and Level, 123. 
54  TNA, Minute from SASO to AOC-in-C Fighter Command, 7 March 1941, AIR 16/373.
55  Brereton Greenhous, Stephen J. Harris, William C. Johnson and William G.P. 
Rawling, The Crucible of War, 1939–1945, Volume 3: The Official History of the 
Royal Canadian Air Force, Vol III (Toronto, Toronto University Press/Department 
of National Defence, 1994), 205.
56  Sholto Douglas, Years of Command, 116.
57  Geoffrey Wellum, First Light (London: Viking, 2002), 253, 255–261, 276–281.
58  Kenneth Cross, Straight and Level (London: Grub Street, 1993), 123.
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Churchill accused Sholto Douglas of fraternising with the enemy59 to 
which a signal claiming that seven Luftwaffe fighters had been shot 
down during Circus 81, the spare leg delivery mission, was quickly 
produced as evidence to suggest otherwise. Clearly, the prime minister 
and senior raf officers thought relative number of aircraft shot down 
or destroyed was the appropriate metric by which to assess the utility 
of such operations. 
Moves to have Circus operations suspended were quashed when 
Portal reminded Sholto Douglas of the need to maintain pressure 
on the Germans in the west in order to relieve the pressure on the 
Russians in the east. So, rather than reducing the sweeps, now 
understood to cause high losses amongst raf pilots to questionable 
effect, Sholto Douglas chose to increase them for reasons of grand 
strategy. Yet concern over the high casualty rates continued and 
after nine pilots were lost in Circus 13, on 18 June 1941, Portal, 
who probably wanted to have answers ready for Churchill, asked for 
details of what had happened. Leigh-Mallory feared that he might be 
blamed for the losses but Portal assured Sholto Douglas that he need 
not have worried and was disturbed that Leigh-Mallory thought that 
he might be open to criticism.60 
Throughout these exchanges the fundamental dynamics of these 
operations had not changed. The Spitfire still lacked the necessary 
range to conduct effective operations over France, or indeed for that 
matter Germany, and the pilots disliked operating over sea far away 
from their airfields. Moreover, the real losses suffered were much 
worse than feared. Nevertheless, when Leigh-Mallory became aware 
that Portal and Churchill wanted the Circus operations to continue, 
his tendency to identify his own interests with those holding power 
again came to the fore and by September 1941 he had set aside his 
worries about the losses. Instead, he became enthused with the idea 
that if only five percent of heavy bombers were employed on regular 
Circus operations it might be possible to induce a large number of 
Luftwaffe fighters into a fight and cause a heavy toll of their fighter 
pilots.61 Air Vice-Marshal Donald Stevenson, however, derided the 
idea and thought Leigh-Mallory was trying to fight “the same kind of 
59  Sholto Douglas, Years of Command (London: Collins, 1966), 138–141.
60  Bill Newton Dunn, Big Wing, 84.
61  Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against 
Germany, 1939–1945, Vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1961), 238–239.
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battle as the Luftwaffe fought in 1940 and since he was using similar 
equipment, must not be surprised if the results are unfavourable.”62 
Eventually, given the effect raf fighter losses were having on the 
morale of its pilots, the Air Ministry conveniently chose to conclude 
that the raf and Luftwaffe had fought themselves to a stalemate and 
that the chief aim of the offensive, to destroy a significant number of 
German fighters, had been realised. By October 1941 it was decided 
to restrict offensive missions by fighter command aircraft.63 Only 
much later did Sholto Douglas lament the loss of 426 pilots killed, 
missing, or taken prisoner in 1941, a greater number than the raf 
lost in the whole of the Battle of Britain.64
Given the scale of the raf losses in the 1941 Circus campaign, 
the concept of manufacturing air battles to write down the Luftwaffe 
had become a political/strategic decision rather than an operational/
military one. In this context, the British saw the German decision 
of March 1942 to transfer forty of their fighter aircraft from the 
Brest and Pas de Calais areas to reinforce fighter strength in Norway 
62  Ibid., Letters Stevenson to C-in-C Bomber Command—Air Marshal Sir Richard 
Pierse 10 September 1941 and to Air Vice-Marshal Sir John Slessor, 14 September 1941.
63  AHB, The Struggle for Air Supremacy (January 1942–May 1945), 112–113
64  Ibid., 89, 116
Signal message relating to the parachute 
dropping of a replacement artificial leg 
over St. Omer, 19 August 1941. [RAF 
Museum]
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and Denmark and protect their bombers attacking British convoys 
heading north, as an opportunity to resume Circus operations and 
apply pressure on the Luftwaffe.65 Yet, in 1942 the Spitfire was still 
a short-range fighter and Dieppe was very close to the edge of its 
range envelope, where it was especially vulnerable. After assessing 
the utility of conducting wing-sized fighter sweeps, Churchill 
concluded that a renewed campaign would be worthwhile but only if 
fighter command lost ‘plane for plane’ with the Luftwaffe.66 Fighter 
Command was instructed to resume its daylight Circus operations 
“with the object of inducing German fighters to accept combat with 
our own covering fighter forces” in order to “inflict casualties in the 
fighting whilst the additional flying which is forced upon the enemy 
will increase normal wastage.”67 The requirement was crystal clear: 
attack targets to destroy as many Luftwaffe fighters as possible 
while, given Churchill’s concern about relative losses, devise tactics 
to minimise disproportionate raf losses. 
The importance of the keeping up the offensive in the west 
was underlined when on 30 April 1942 Air Vice-Marshal Norman 
Bottomley, the deputy Chief of the Air Staff at the Air Ministry, 
directed fighter command to intensify day fighter activity as its 
first priority.68 Yet, less than seven weeks later the superiority 
of the new Luftwaffe fighter, the fw 190, over the Spitfire v had 
become abundantly apparent and Bottomley, now assistant Chief of 
the Air Staff (Operations), directed fighter command to restrain its 
‘sweeps’ and deeper penetrations into France until the new Spitfire 
ix or Typhoon fighters came on line in sufficient numbers to tilt the 
balance back in the raf’s favour.69
Given this background, any offensive counter air campaign 
to gain air superiority and destroy or reduce the Luftwaffe over 
Dieppe would require imaginative planning, coordination, and 
synchronisation. During the planning for the Dieppe raid, Leigh-
Mallory received the intelligence assessment on the scale of the threat 
65  Air Historical Branch (AHB), Struggle for Air Supremacy, 102.
66  Portal Papers, Christ Church, Oxford, “Churchill to Portal,” 8 March 1942, 
PREM 3/333/19.
67  TNA, Confidential supplement to Air Power and War Rights by J.M. Spaight, 
S.46368/DCAS to Fighter Command, 13 March 1942, described in AIR 41/5, 
International Law of the Air, 1939–1945.
68  AHB, The Struggle for Air Supremacy, 105.
69  Campbell, Dieppe Revisited, 186.
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posed by the Luftwaffe and he would have been acutely aware of the 
likely response to the ‘bait’ created by the largely Canadian assault 
on Dieppe. Furthermore, Leigh-Mallory’s evolving awareness of the 
raf’s failure to secure air superiority over northern France influenced 
his judgement that the very best he could achieve was a temporary 
degree of air superiority sufficient to enable the raid and protect the 
ships, and this explains his fears that such an operation would prove 
expensive in terms of aircraft and pilots. In trying to do all that was 
expected of him by his combined operations colleagues he would have 
realised that the majority of his Spitfires would have to operate at a 
slight tactical disadvantage, something his pilots had always wished 
to avoid.
It is interesting to speculate whether or not Bottomley’s directive 
of 13 June had reached Leigh-Mallory by 15 June, when he supported 
the intention to remount Rutter as Jubilee, but it certainly solidified 
his worries that the raf might lose a significant number of aircraft 
and pilots over Dieppe.70 Two weeks later, after pondering the 
worst-case consequences, he decided to voice his concerns to Sholto 
Douglas, effectively admitting that the fighter sweep policy had again 
failed to achieve the temporary air superiority intended as it had not 
extracted the toll of the Luftwaffe aircraft desired. In planning for 
the raid on Dieppe he thought:
 
the casualties will, I expect, be relatively high and we can, I suggest, 
be well satisfied if our losses do not exceed, say 60 to 70 pilots, and 120 
aircraft in the squadrons providing fighter cover … because we cannot 
claim to have attained air superiority in North West France … once our 
plan is clear to the enemy, the initiative is his, and he can choose his 
moment to concentrate his forces.71
In answering this perceptive and reasoned analysis Sholto 
Douglas, no doubt mindful of the political imperative, questioned 
Leigh-Mallory’s determination to see things through and, in a 
70  TNA, Minutes of Meeting held at COHQ on Monday, 15th June 1942, to discuss 
certain points concerning Operation “RUTTER.” 15 June 1942, DEFE 2/546.
71  TNA, Mallory memorandum, Operations in France 25 May 1942, 25 May 1942, 
DEFE 2/306. TNA, Force Commanders meeting of 15 June 1942. 29 June 1942, 
AIR 16/760.
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typically Trenchardian retort, showed no intention of doing anything 
to change the course of events: 
 
I do not know however quite what you expect me to do about it. I 
certainly do not propose to call the operation off. If I may say so, 
I think you are worrying too much about these possible casualties. 
Unfortunately, one cannot often win a battle without considerable 
casualties, however much one would like to do so.72
The problem, of course, was that no one really knew the toll of 
German aircraft the RAF had really bachieved and in trying to meet 
Churchill’s ‘plane for plane’ metric, a question mark must be raised 
over fighter command’s lethargy in cross-correlating the pilots kill 
claim reports with intelligence derived from ‘Y’ Service intercepts and 
ulTra-derived information to better determine the actual losses. Overt 
scepticism and constructive dissent appear to have been entirely absent; 
instead blind faith in the numbers claimed prevailed. The evidence 
now shows that Leigh-Mallory’s doubts were fully justified and the 
campaign before August 1942 had been an operational and tactical 
disaster. Even if the raf fighter pilots had shot down the 197 Luftwaffe 
aircraft they claimed from March to June 1942 they would have failed 
to meet the ‘plane for plane’ target set by Churchill because the raf 
lost 259 aircraft during the same period. The actual ratio of losses was 
much worse: the Luftwaffe only lost 58 aircraft.73
an raf plan limited to what it could do
As the date of the Dieppe raid approached it was clear that the 
majority of the raf fighters would be at a qualitative disadvantage 
to the Luftwaffe’s fw 190 fighters but they did have the benefit 
of greater numbers and, as Richard Overy and Paul Kennedy 
have suggested, given the qualitative advantages of one aircraft 
over another were quite small the relative numbers of aircraft 
available to each side often made the difference to the outcome of 
72  TNA. Sholto Douglas to Leigh-Mallory, 30 June 1942. AIR 16/760.
73  Ibid., 105; and Campbell, Dieppe Revisited, 189.
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the air war.74 In May 1940 the raf allocated approximately 200 
fighters to the Dunkirk operation. Facing them the Luftwaffe had 
up 550 Luftwaffe fighters and 300 assorted bombers.75At Dieppe 
the balance was reversed, forty-eight of the seventy mainly raf 
squadrons involved were fighters, almost 600 aircraft. Of these less 
than fifty were the Spitfire ix model, which was superior to the fw 
190. Arranged against them British Intelligence assessed that the 
Luftwaffe had only 260 first-line fighters available between Texel 
and Brest (only 225 were actually serviceable) and that only 120 
of these, operating from Abbeville, would be able to provide the 
initial fighter opposition. British Intelligence also estimated that the 
Luftwaffe had 220 bombers in the west (the actual figure was 175).76 
Moreover, the attackers would benefit from the advantage of having 
tactical surprise and be mainly focused on achieving temporary air 
superiority over the raiding naval and land forces during the short 
period of the assault and withdrawal.77 Twenty-four b-17 Flying 
Fortresses from the United States Army Air Force (usaaf) Eighth 
Air Force, flying only their second operational mission, were tasked 
to attack the Luftwaffe airfield at Abbeville, escorted by the four 
Spitfire ix squadrons.78 Presumably, the timing of this attack was 
delayed in order to retain the element of surprise at Dieppe but 
this meant that the offensive counter air bombing was scheduled 
to coincide with the withdrawal of the attacking forces. This, of 
course, was very different to what Leigh-Mallory had proposed in 
1931 when he suggested the launching of surprise attacks on the eve 
of important military operations.
Villa believed that the decision to exclude bombing from the 
Jubilee raid plan was one of the major reasons for its failure, but 
in 1942 bombing of French towns to provide fire support to ground 
troops was rejected by the politicians. French representatives had 
repeatedly complained to the British about the raf’s bombing of 
74  Richard J. Overy, The Air War 1939–1945 (London: Europa, 1980), 47–60. Paul 
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), 
353–354.
75  Terraine, The Right of the Line, 154–155.
76  F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Volume 2, Its Influence 
on Strategy and Operations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 702.
77  Sholto Douglas, Years of Command, 175. See also N. Franks, The Greatest Air 
Battle: Dieppe, 19th August 1942 (London: Grub Street, 1997), 18
78  Franks, Greatest Air Battle, 98–100.
23
Stubbs: An Analysis of Factors Affecting the Royal Air Force Contribution
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2016
24 Factors Affecting the RAF Contribution to the Raid on Dieppe
coastal towns in 1940 and 1941; these killed 1,650 and injured 2,311 
civilians. In May 1941 the mayors of four coastal towns, including 
Dieppe, protested through the United States Legation at Vichy about 
heavy bombing of residential areas and the British Foreign Secretary 
Anthony Eden asked the Air Ministry to take every care to minimise 
damage to civilian property and civilian casualties.79 In April 1942 
raf bombing of the Renault works at Billancourt on the outskirts of 
Paris killed 367 French civilians, injured another 341 and made 9,250 
people homeless. The high casualty toll presented the Germans with 
a profitable propaganda story and caused the British war Cabinet to 
worry how killing French civilians might affect the level of support 
the Allies could expect to receive from the French population they 
were hoping to liberate. So intense was the nervousness about such 
attacks that in May 1942 a raid on the Schneider armaments and 
locomotive works at Le Creusot was cancelled, though this decision 
was eventually reversed in July 1942. When, in June 1942, Air Chief-
Marshal Philip Joubert de la Ferté, air operations commander-in-
chief coastal command, proposed the bombing of German submarine 
pens in French coastal towns, to mitigate the devastating effects of 
the German submarine attacks on Allied shipping, the secretary of 
state for air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, thought the idea so odious that he 
declared that the proposed risks to civilian casualties were politically 
unacceptable: 
 
“… it would be useless to ask the Cabinet to embark on a policy of 
ruthless attacks on French towns.” The air staff concluded “that the 
desired military object could not be achieved by the form of attack.”80
It is clear, therefore, that at the time of the planning for the raid on 
Dieppe there was no political appetite to sanction any bombing that 
might cause significant French civilian casualties, and even if there 
had been it would have required a very robust and verifiable audit 
trail to authorise it; something notably absent from the Dieppe raid’s 
approval process. Villa’s idea that an raf conspiracy sought to deny 
bombing support to the Dieppe raid ignores the political reluctance 
79  Richard Overy, The Bombing War: Europe 1939–1945 (London: Allen Lane, 
2013), 550–551.
80  Peter Mangold, Britain and the Defeated French: From occupation to Liberation, 
1940–1944 (London: I.B.Taurus, 2012), 96–97.
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to employ such methods in mid-1942. Moreover, Air Marshal Arthur 
Harris’s objection to the bombing of Dieppe, on the grounds that 
his bombers would need the protection of the night, was based on 
the assumption that raf fighters would be unable to provide the 
protection they would need, which was hardly a vote of confidence 
for the narrative of repeated success over France painted by Fighter 
Command. Instead, Harris preferred to let the usaaf bombers play a 
role at Dieppe in accordance with their daylight tactics.
By 9:30 a.m., when the order to evacuate Dieppe had been made, 
it was obvious that the raid had failed.81 At that time the Luftwaffe 
had only managed to get twenty to thirty aircraft on patrol at any 
one time and despite Luftwaffe attempts to commit all of its bombers 
against the attackers it was 10:00 a.m., thirty minutes after the decision 
to evacuate, before the first two of these arrived on the scene. Only 
another 125 Luftwaffe bomber sorties were launched during the rest 
of the day. In stark contrast to the 945 sorties flown by the Luftwaffe 
the raf flew 2,604 to provide air cover. The relative number of aircraft 
committed to the air battle and the number of missions flown are 
significant because raf offensive doctrine sought to overwhelm the 
defenders and because of the importance placed by the prime minister 
on the relative numbers of aircraft lost. Therefore, a better metric of 
the raf performance and effectiveness at Dieppe would be to assess 
how well it performed against the Luftwaffe aircraft ranged against it 
as well as by its ability to deliver and sustain an air umbrella over the 
rn and beachhead.
suboptimal command and control 
With understandable logic, Leigh-Mallory and Mountbatten thought 
the operations bunker at hq 11 Group would be the best place to 
monitor the progress of the Dieppe raid as they would be able to see 
the air plots on the operations room table and correlate these with 
the reports from the rn and army commanders aboard hms Calpe 
with which their headquarter was expected to be in continuous radio 
81  Francis George Gillard - War Correspondent, IWM Oral History interview, Reel 
1 22:49 to 28:05, dated 1/10/1989, available at http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/
item/object/80010367
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contract.82 This apparently rational decision naively adjudged the 
technical and practical difficulties of squeezing the communications 
required for a major joint force headquarters operation into a single 
service headquarters relatively easy to manage. Though the post 
Dieppe pamphlet published by the Ministry of Information claimed 
that “Leigh-Mallory … could see with great clarity every move of the 
battle as it took place before him on a great map” and “knew exactly 
what was happening and was able to anticipate every move of the 
enemy in the air” the reality was that the Dieppe raid was much 
bigger than anything Leigh-Mallory had handled in his time at 11 
Group.83 He struggled to keep abreast of what was happening when 
communications broke down, the landings went awry the amount 
of data coming into the headquarters began to overwhelm his staff. 
It did not help that Major-General John Roberts, who commanded 
the landing forces from hms Calpe, was unable to observe what 
was happening because smoke in the vicinity of the assault and 
the screen protecting the Royal Navy warships obscured his view. 
Communications breakdown reduced Roberts’s understanding of 
what was happening on the beaches, which in turn made it difficult 
for him to keep Mountbatten informed about what was going on so 
he, in turn, could direct operations accordingly. Moreover, outgoing 
messages from Uxbridge to hms Calpe did not always reach the 
military commander afloat. This made it necessary for Roberts to 
repeat his requests for close support, which caused excessive delay 
in matching aircraft to targets. Ultimately, the confusion over which 
unit had control of the aircraft, at Uxbridge, resulted in missed 
opportunities to relieve the pressure on those fighting on the ground.84
At 11 Group headquarters it proved impossible to cross-correlate 
Morse code intercepts with the voluminous voice traffic, or to relate 
intercepted German voice traffic to the operational situation. The 
tactical intelligence picture became so confused that it failed to detect 
Luftwaffe fighters coming from neighbouring sectors to reinforce the 
82  Dunn, Big Wing, 88. Neillands, The Dieppe Raid: The story of the disastrous 1942 
expedition, 122.
83  The Ministry of Information, Combined Operations (London: HMSO, 1943), 133. 
84  TNA, Report by Flight Lieutenant Gerald Le Blount Kidd RAFVR, 24 August 1942, 
AIR 16/765. Report by the Air Force Commander on the combined operation against 
Dieppe—19 August 1942, 5 September 1942. “Operation Jubilee, Questionnaire for 
Air Force Commander,” and “Answers to Questionnaire, 12 Sept. 1942,” AIR 16/765.
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Dieppe area.85 This resulted in Leigh-Mallory’s wings being poorly 
positioned to intercept the incoming attacks. The experienced raf 
fighter ace Johnnie Johnson led four sorties over Dieppe but his 
wing was never able to establish communications with hms Calpe, 
to receive direction and guidance from the raf controllers. Little 
wonder Johnson found the battle confusing.86 To gauge what was 
really happening in the air battle over Dieppe, Leigh-Mallory began 
to rely on the reports made by Group Captain Harry Broadhurst, 
his deputy senior air staff officer, who also flew 4 sorties over Dieppe 
in his Spitfire before landing and calling by telephone to explain 
what he had seen of the battle. Around 9:00 a.m., at Biggin Hill, 
Broadhurst, like Lawson and Park earlier, concluded the wing 
operations were unwieldy. He advised Leigh-Mallory that Spitfire 
ix’s should patrol in pairs between Le Treport in order to intercept 
Luftwaffe fw 190 fighters that were avoiding the wing-sized patrols. 
Air battle management, using the integrated air defence system, had 
broken down: it was as if the development of radar, radiotelephony, 
and signals intelligence had never happened. 
85  Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 703.
86  Johnnie Johnson, Wing Leader (London: David & Charles, 1974), 146. IWM 
Interview, Johnson, James Edgar ‘Johnnie’. Available at http://www.iwm.org.uk/
collections/item/object/80010127 reel 2, 07:07 to 09:20
Group Captain Harry Broadhurst. [UK Crown Copyright. Courtesy of AHB(RAF)]
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Things got so bad that less than half an hour after the order 
to evacuate had been given Leigh-Mallory was obliged to ask hms 
Calpe for a situation report. The response was: “Situation too 
obscure to give useful report. Air co-operation faultless. Enemy 
air opposition now increasing. Have you any questions?” Although 
this was a subjective assessment made in the heat of the battle it 
was widely and frequently reported in its shortened version “Air 
co-operation faultless” to suggest the raf’s performance had been 
nothing less than magnificent. The full report tells an altogether 
different story: that no clear understanding of what was happening 
on the beaches existed, the battle was still raging, and the outcome 
was still far from decided. The raf had, so far, done what was 
expected of it in delivering air cover for the assaulting forces. 
Although Leigh-Mallory’s post-raid report obliquely acknowledged 
the communication problems described by an air controller on board 
hms Calpe, the value of having a forward air controller on one of 
the hq ships did not subsequently appear in the Jubilee Lessons 
Learned even though this oversight had been a major cause of the 
coordination difficulties encountered.87
analysis 
It is clear that whatever the apparent similarities between the raf’s 
support to the raid on Dieppe and the natural evolution of combined 
operations doctrine, there were a number of self-imposed factors 
that limited the options available to Leigh-Mallory.
Trenchard’s doctrine of offensive action, with its emphasis on 
attacking enemy morale had never been seriously challenged by any of 
his subordinates who reached high rank; they believed the validity of 
the theory. Consequently, in a desire to rid Fighter Command of what 
was perceived to be overly defensive tactics, the raf adopted Big Wing 
tactics in an attempt to inflict high losses on its Luftwaffe opponent. 
By then, however, with the Battle of Britain won, the dynamics of 
the ensuing air battle had changed and the Luftwaffe adopted tactics 
broadly similar to those employed by Fighter Command in order to 
87  Greenhous et al., The Crucible of War, 1939–1945, Volume 3:The Official History 
of the Royal Canadian Air Force (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 
240–242. Campbell, Dieppe Revisited, 217. 
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remain elusive whilst denying the air superiority the raf craved over 
France. Consequently, instead of significantly reducing the Luftwaffe 
and achieving temporary air superiority over France from late 1940 
onwards the raf’s pilots began to suffer from an erosion of confidence 
and morale when they realised that their activities were failing to 
yield the results required. The irony, therefore, was that the tactics 
defined by Dowding and employed by Park were highly effective in 
achieving the desired Trenchardian outcome on the enemy’s fighting 
morale. Subsequently, raf freedom of action was constrained by its 
adherence to Big Wing offensive tactics because of a conspiracy of 
optimism created by naïve faith in the kill claims made by its pilots.88 
This, in turn, was galvanised by Churchill’s interest in the relative 
losses suffered by the raf and Luftwaffe.
Fighter command’s post-Dieppe raid kill claims passed on to 
Mountbatten and Churchill maintained that 95 Luftwaffe aircraft 
had been destroyed, thirty-eight probably destroyed and 140 
damaged, for the loss of ninety-eight raf aircraft.89 After the raid 
on Dieppe, Leigh-Mallory was so wedded to belief in his pilots’ 
kill claims that he chose to think the Germans had deliberately 
concealed their losses to higher authorities. Air Commodore John 
Whitworth Jones, fighter command’s director of fighter operations, 
was so similarly convinced that the real Luftwaffe losses had been 
underestimated that he disregarded the objective evidence from 
pilots’ combat reports, gun cameras and Y service intercepts of 
Luftwaffe bomber call-signs because it suggested the Luftwaffe had 
only lost ninety-two aircraft. Indeed, Leigh-Mallory chose to latch 
on to a figure that tallied with his subjective assessment of what 
had happened and was apt to quote Luftwaffe losses of 170 aircraft, 
which he gleaned from an obscure Vichy source, as proof of his 
success to Churchill and to the press.90 
Over Dieppe on 19 August 1942 the Luftwaffe actually lost 
forty-eight aircraft,91 the raf 106.92 On first sight these figures 
88  Bungay, Most Dangerous Enemy 333.
89  CAB/65/31/18, Chief of Combined Operations, 20 August 1942. Air Ministry to 
C-in-C Middle East, Most Secret Cypher Telegram, TULIP 222 For Prime Minister 
from C.C.O, 20 August 1942. 
90  Campbell, Dieppe Revisited, 187. “The Attack on Dieppe,” The Times 9 September 
1942, 5.
91  Campbell, Dieppe Revisited:), 187–188.
92  AHB Struggle for Air Supremacy January 1942 to May 1945, 124–126.
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appear to show a very poor return against the claims made at the time 
but they ought to be viewed in the context of the actual figures for the 
previous four months of Circus operations. Looked at this way the 
raf’s performance at Dieppe was actually a marked improvement. 
Unfortunately, Leigh-Mallory’s willingness to accept the kill claims 
made by raf fighter pilots at Dieppe made him think he had stumbled 
on a formula to achieve the air superiority required for the invasion 
later planned in Normandy and in the interim he attempted to get 
cohq to repeat similar raids. The Americans, unbound by dubious 
doctrine or closed minds with regard to long-range fighters, read 
events very differently. They concluded that large numbers of fighters 
fitted with long-range fuel tanks would reduce any tactical advantage 
provided by Luftwaffe radar and would help the usaaf to overwhelm 
and defeat the Luftwaffe. Of course, that is what they did.
The final factor influencing Leigh-Mallory in the planning for 
Dieppe was the Royal Navy’s grudging acceptance that ships were 
vulnerable to air attack, which together with the army’s desire for 
an air umbrella and the raf’s conceptual aversion to ground attack 
and offensive counter air missions constrained the options for Leigh-
Mallory to use his short-range fighters. Consequently, Leigh-Mallory’s 
plan was simple and the tactics used at Dieppe in 1942 were scaled to 
overwhelm well-organised Luftwaffe defences. 
However, the method to achieve Leigh-Mallory’s objectives was 
compromised by the suboptimal command, control and communication 
arrangements, which struggled to cope with the deluge of information 
received. Leigh-Mallory lost control of the air battle as Johnson’s 
confused and free ranging wing missions clearly demonstrated. That 
said, the timely input of Broadhurst assuaged the damage and in 
relative terms Leigh-Mallory’s fighters had done significantly better 
than during the previous three months of Circus operations. For him, 
despite the hybrid operational focus and its multifarious aims and 
objectives, Dieppe was a relative success, albeit an expensive one. 
Leigh-Mallory had hoped that his plan would draw the Luftwaffe 
away from its clever defensive strategy into fighting a larger air battle 
where the odds were evened out, and to a certain degree this is what 
happened. Had Leigh-Mallory stood by his 1931 interpretation of air 
superiority, challenged Sholto Douglas’s views on long-range fighters 
and been more skeptical about the kill claims made by his fighter 
pilots he may have been able to do more than provide an air umbrella 
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for the assaulting forces at Dieppe even though that might not have 
earned the accolade of providing ‘faultless support.’
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
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